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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE,
ENVIRONMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS,




Who owns the Earth and its resources? To what extent may
the general public claim the pure water, clean air, rich soil, and the
myriad services Earth provides to sustain human life? Across
continents and spanning centuries, a dynamic tension continues
between those who would circumscribe the Earth's bounty for
private use and those who would carefully allot Earth's riches to
satisfy human needs.'
Private property-sequestering Earth's resources for personal,
exclusive use-has its zealous advocates, and in many locales its
legal status is unimpeachable, and its ideology is unquestioned.
But a competing ideology, dating from antiquity, holds that some
of Earth's riches should never be sequestered for private use, must
be left for the public's enjoyment, and must be stewarded by those
in power. Codified 1,500 years ago during the Roman Empire,
legal scholars labeled this the "Public Trust Doctrine."
The Public Trust Doctrine perseveres as a value system and
an ethic as its expression in law mutates and evolves. More
recently, scholars, activists, and lawyers have begun discussing the
rights of people to access and enjoy various essential resources and
J.D., 2008, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; LL.M.,
2008, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; Ph.D.,
Cornell University, Science & Technology Studies; M.A., Cornell University,
History and Philosophy of Science; B.S., Cornell University, Biological
Sciences. The author wishes to thank Brian Gray, Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Matthew
Visick, Larry Carbone, and the stellar editors at the NYU Environmental Law
Journal for their indispensable aid and inspiration.
1 Of course, many environmentalists argue that regions of the Earth should
be sustained for nonhuman use. Delightful though I find that idea, I treat it only
tangentially herein.
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services the Earth so generously yields. The spreading notion of
"Environmental Human Rights" expresses the same persistent
notion that sometimes, for some resources and in some places, it is
immoral and illegal for private parties to arrogate what the Earth
provides freely and what is necessary for human health and
happiness.
Yet the "Public Trust Doctrine" and "Environmental Human
Rights" do not convey precisely the same idea and do not carry the
same legal weight in the United States or abroad. I begin this
article by tracing the historical origins of the Public Trust
Doctrine, charting its (r)evolutionary leaps across centuries,
continents, legal regimes, and environmental entities. I show how
Joseph Sax, a law professor, breathed new legal, philosophical,
and political life into the idea. I then shift legal gears and
introduce the eliding, slippery connotations of the term "rights." I
explore how the notion of "Environmental Human Rights"
complements and expands the Public Trust Doctrine's legal
connotations, which, for 1,500 years, have constrained how Earth's
resources can be used and have guided who must bear
responsibility for stewarding resources for the public good.
When employed individually, as I illustrate for Pennsylvania
and California, the Public Trust Doctrine and Environmental
Human Rights may constrain what government officials and
private property owners may do. When working together in
synergism-as they do in South Africa, India, and elsewhere, as I
shall investigate here-they impose new responsibilities on
governments to steward the Earth for the benefit of citizens, and
they put powerful constraints on what counts as "private,"
"property," and "ownership"--calling into question what "owners"
can do with "their" land.
As humans destroy habitat, impair ecosystems, and change
climate, we will more acutely depend on functioning ecosystems.
Those who would protect the Earth and its human citizens will, I
believe, make more extensive use of the Public Trust Doctrine and
Environmental Human Rights to develop legal strategies that
preserve for the many what should not be fenced off by the few.
This article provides a guide for how to proceed.
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I. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
A. A Brief History of the Public Trust Doctrine
1,500 years ago, the Roman Emperor Justinian simplified the
jumble of laws governing his Empire. He commissioned dozens of
the era's leading jurists, whose wisdom became codified in the
Corpus Juris Civilis.2 In 529, Justinian added these words to one
section: "By the law of nature these things are common to all
mankind, the air, running water, the sea and consequently the
shores of the sea.",3 The Public Trust Doctrine, as this notion came
to be known, suggests that certain resources-usually water, but
now much more-are common, shared property of all citizens,
stewarded in perpetuity by the State.4
Several hundred years after the fall of the Roman Empire, a
copy of the Corpus Juris Civilis was rediscovered in Pisa, and
scholars spent centuries analyzing the tome.5 In the peripatetic
manner that has come to characterize it, the Public Trust Doctrine
migrated with the Corpus Juris Civilis throughout Europe, to both
civil law and common law regimes.6 The Magna Carta codified
Justinian's words in England, and in 1225 King John was forced to
revoke his cronies' exclusive fishing and hunting rights, because
this violated the public's right to access these common resources.7
Thus in England, while the King had vested ownership of public
lands, he stewarded them in trust for the public. This notion of
government ownership of resources held in trust as a commons is a
shared precept in all places where the Public Trust Doctrine
persists.
8
The Public Trust Doctrine passed into the common law of the
individual states during America's founding years, following the
2 THOMAS GLYN WATKIN, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO MODERN
CIVIL LAW 63 (1999).
3 Mark Dowie, In Law We Trust, ORION, July-Aug. 2005, at 18, 20.
4 Id. at 19.
5 WATKIN, supra note 2, at 81.
6 See Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: A
Historical Analysis. 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13, 26 (1976); Carl Shadi Paganelli,
Creative Judicial Misunderstanding: Misapplication of the Public Trust Doctrine
in Michigan. 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1098-02 (2007); Joseph L. Sax,
Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 185, 189 (1980).
7 Dowie, supra note 3, at 20-2 1.
8 Id. at 21.
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"general rule that land titles from the federal government run down
only to the high water mark, with title seaward of that point
remaining in the states, which, upon their admission to the Union,
took such shorelands in 'trusteeship' for the public." 9 At least for
the first two centuries in the United States, the Public Trust
Doctrine did not extend to dry land.10 The Public Trust Doctrine
formally entered American jurisprudence in 1821, when the New
Jersey State Court held in Arnold v. Mundy that the government
could not, "consistently with the principles of the law of nature and
the constitution of a well ordered society, make a direct and
absolute grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens
of their common right."'"
Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois is the seminal American
case framing the Public Trust Doctrine. 12 When Illinois attempted
to give Chicago's entire lakeshore to a private railroad, the
Supreme Court held that the lake and the ground under were
protected by "a title held in trust for the people of the State that
they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce
over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the
obstruction or interference of private parties."' 13 The Public Trust
Doctrine did not mean these resources were frozen in time and use.
The legislature could pass statutes facilitating navigation (e.g.,
building Wharves or docks), and a legislature might discharge
resources held in the public trust. 14 But such actions are limited by
the principle that "control of the State for the purposes of the trust
can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in
promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of
without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the
lands and waters remaining."'
' 5
Illinois Central stands for the proposition that the Public Trust
Doctrine does not allow the state government to abdicate its
stewardship of navigable water bodies or the land under them, as
9 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law.
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 476 (1970).
to See id.
11 Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 53 (1821).
12 146 U.S. 387 (1892); see JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT:
A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION 170-71 (1971).
13 Il. Cent., 146 U.S. at452.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 453.
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
[Volume 16
HeinOnline  -- 16 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 714 2008
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
"[s]uch abdication is not consistent with the exercise of that trust
which requires the government of the State to preserve such waters
for the use of the public."' 6 Legislatures must exercise their police
powers consistent with the public trust, and may not subjugate this
stewardship responsibility to needs of private interests: "[t]he trust
devolving upon the State for the public, and which can only be
discharged by the management and control of property in which
the public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of
the property."' 7  While other common law doctrines may be
undone by explicit legislation, the Public Trust Doctrine seems
sacrosanct, holding a power beyond modification or revocation by
legislative action. 18
We see in the Illinois Central decision three elements that will
inform subsequent evolution of the Public Trust Doctrine in
American jurisprudence: the sovereign holds certain resources in
trust for the common good; the public has some kind of right to
protection of these resources; and while democracy may seem
subverted when a court overrules the acts of elected officials, such
judicial acts in fact serve democracy by preserving rights invested
in all the people.
B. Joseph Sax and the Public Trust Doctrine
Occasionally law review articles change the world. As one
scholar puts it, Joseph Sax's article, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, "represents
every law professor's dream: a law review article that not only
revived a dormant area of the law but continues to be relied upon
by courts some two decades later."'19 This still holds true more
than three decades later, including, as I describe below, in India
and South Africa. Sax found in the Public Trust Doctrine a legal
tool that any citizen could use to fight exploitation of resources
that should rightfully be protected common property. In his
writings, as I will trace here, Sax elucidates the Public Trust
Doctrine and lays out a vision for how the doctrine has worked and
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of
American Property Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515, 523 (1989).
19 Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western
Water Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine 19 ENVTL. L. 573, 574
(1989) (citing Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 9).
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should work in American jurisprudence.
Three conceptual principles justify the Public Trust
Doctrine.2 0 First, "certain interests are so intrinsically important to
every citizen that their free availability tends to mark the society as
one of citizens rather than of serfs. 21 Thus no small subset of
individuals should ever be allowed to control these interests.22
Second, "certain interests are so particularly the gifts of nature's
bounty that they ought to be reserved for the whole of the
populace., 23 Finally, "certain uses have a peculiarly public nature
that makes their adaptation to private use inappropriate.
'24
From these philosophical underpinnings derive further
fundamental principles inherent in the Public Trust Doctrine.
First, citizens have legally enforceable rights equal in dignity to
private property owners. 25 When people talk of a "right to a decent
environment," it implies that people have rights "simply by virtue
of their status as members of the public and that those rights
should be phrased in a way to put them on a plane with traditional
private property rights." 26 Sax evokes the Public Trust Doctrine to
make what has previously been considered valueless-i.e.,
resources held for the public good-accrue economic value
comparable to that accorded private property.
27
But declaring "rights" alone won't solve problems of public
trust resource exploitation. Sax is concerned with a "problem that
frequently arises in public trust cases-that is, a diffuse majority is
made subject to the will of a concerted minority. 28  That
"concerted minority" is private property owners whose private
economic interests lead them to arrogate ecological resources,
which, by right, belong to the public.2 9 From Justinian onward, the
public was not always entitled to enforce its interest in its common
property. 30 For Sax, "[a]n essential question that must be asked




24 Id. at 485.
25 See SAx, DEFENDNG, supra note 12, at xix.
26 Id. at 158.
27 See SAX, DEFENDING, supra note 12, at 173.
28 Id. at 560
29 See id.
31 See id. at 475.
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whenever proposals for an environmental declaration of rights are
raised is whether those rights are going to be enforceable, and if
so, by whom.,'3
Sax finds a procedural right to challenge government
decisions that violate stewardship responsibilities inherent in the
Public Trust Doctrine. The Public Trust Doctrine "is no more-
and no less-than a name courts give to their concerns about
insufficiencies of the democratic process. 32  Citizens must be
allowed to intervene in the process between the powerful private
interest and the corruptible professional regulator.33 The Public
Trust Doctrine means undoing a system where the "citizen who
comes to an administrative agency comes essentially as a
supplicant, requesting that somehow the public interest be
interpreted to protect the environmental values from which he
benefits. The citizen who comes to court has quite a different
status-he stands as a claimant of rights to which he is entitled. 34
For Sax, the "public" should necessarily have standing to speak for
its own rights, for what they mean, and for when they are violated.
And thus Sax cites Illinois Central for the
central substantive thought in public trust litigation. When a
state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the
general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism
upon any government conduct which is calculated either to
reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject
public uses to the self-interest of private parties.
35
While the actual use is not frozen, legislatures (with judicial
oversight) may only change what the use is as the public needs or
values change. 36 Furthermore, the Public Trust Doctrine does not
connote the government's everyday general obligation to act for
the public good; rather, the Public Trust Doctrine demands a
"special, and more demanding, obligation which it may have as a
trustee of certain public resources.,
37
Thus Sax's notion of the Public Trust Doctrine articulates a
philosophy where public interests in the environment do and
3' SAX, DEFENDING, supra note 12, at 235.
32 Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 9, at 521.
13 See id. at 498.
34 SAX, DEFENDING, supra note 12, at 58.
35 Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 9, at 490.
36 See, e.g., id. at 495.
17 Id. at 478.
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should trump private interests. Sax derives a democratic means for
enforcing these public interests, as "[t]o devise a theory of public
rights and a means of enforcing them is thus an essential step
towards protecting environmental values." 38  Sax wants "a
fundamental realignment of power" with the citizen as "an active
initiator with the authority to tip the balance of power" from public
to private, from bureaucrats to everyman, from exploitation to
sustainable stewardship. 39 The Public Trust Doctrine names an
ancient belief about the proper relationship between citizens,
nature, and government; each successful legal use of the Public
Trust Doctrine translates this belief into more responsible
stewardship of natural resources.
C. Resources Protected by the Public Trust Doctrine
The Public Trust Doctrine's power comes from the
longstanding idea that some parts of the natural world are gifts of
nature so essential to human life that private interests cannot usurp
them, and so the sovereign must steward them to prevent such
capture. The philosophy and the obligation are the central
elements of the doctrine, not the specific resources to which the
ideas and duties attach. As such, the Public Trust Doctrine's reach
seems constrained only by the imagination of those who would
protect both the natural world and the public's right to the
sustainable use of that world.
While Sax's notion of the Public Trust Doctrine focused
heavily on the public interest in resources and how those interests
may be safeguarded, others emphasize an expanded set of
resources themselves that the Public Trust Doctrine safeguards.4 °
While Professor William Araiza summarizes criticisms of the
Public Trust Doctrine as a "backward-looking, antidemocratic
vestige whose time, if it ever existed, has passed," he also argues
that its successes have energized activists who have used it to
shore up resource protection beyond the Doctrine's traditional
shores.4' Furthermore, as we shall see below, the doctrine has
38 SAx, DEFENDING, supra note 12, at 59.
39 Id. at 64.
40 See, e.g., Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land
Law, U.C. DAVIS. L. REv. 269, 315-16 (1980).
41 William Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-
based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a
Substantive Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REv. 385, 404 (1997).
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been astonishingly malleable in buttressing fundamental human
rights to a range of ecological resources in India, South Africa, and
elsewhere.
From Justinian's time until quite recently, the Public Trust
Doctrine covered a narrow range of resources. For the most part,
the Public Trust Doctrine has protected "that aspect of the public
domain below the low-water mark on the margin of the sea and the
great lakes, the waters over those lands, and the waters within
rivers and streams of any consequence. '' 2 Occasionally United
States common law explication of the Public Trust Doctrine has
included parklands donated to the public.
43
Journalist Mark Dowie asks this key question that has been
pursued by other defenders of environmental resources: "[w]hy
then, can't a doctrine that was designed to defend and protect a
very narrow aspect of the commons, water, not evolve, as so much
of our common law has evolved, to protect more if not all of the
commons?" 44 Similarly, Sax urged "Liberating the.Public Trust
Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles. 45 Earlier, he had suggested
that the substantive and procedural protections courts had granted
under the Public Trust Doctrine could certainly be applied to
"controversies involving air pollution, the dissemination of
pesticides, the location of rights of way for utilities, and strip
mining or wetland filling on private lands in a state where
governmental permits are required. 'A 6 Furthermore, he believed
the Public Trust Doctrine could be applied to social welfare and
consumer controversies.47
Professor Harrison Dunning suggests that fish, wildlife, and
wilderness areas might easily fall under the protections of the
Public Trust Doctrine because they are scarce resources naturally
suited for public use.48 And, in fact, the Public Trust'Doctrine has
been quite peripatetic in the years since Sax reinvigorated it.
Professor Lloyd Cohen describes the Public Trust Doctrine's
"journey from the sea, up navigable streams, to unnavigable
streams, its leap to inland ponds, and then like our amphibian
42 Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 9, at 556.
43 Id.
44 Dowie, supra note 3, at 24.
45 Sax, Liberating, supra note 6, at 185.
46 Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 9, at 556-57.
41 See id. at 557.
48 See Dunning, supra note 18, at 518-19, 523.
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ancestors its eventual emergence from the water and march across
the land." 49  Courts have held that the Public Trust Doctrine
applies to wildlife.5 0  Araiza documents that resources covered
under the Public Trust Doctrine have extended to parks, historical
areas, cemeteries, archaeological sites and remains, works of art,
and recreation areas. 51 As we will see below, a seminal case
establishing the Public Trust Doctrine in India was about a public
park and market.
52
Sax and those scholars who have followed him provide us
with an adroit legal tool rooted in a venerable ethical obligation.
That tool can be (and has been) used to maintain or shift control of
a wide range of ecological resources from private to public use.
But the Public Trust Doctrine has its legal shortcomings. Its
underlying philosophy finds potent, updated legal expression in the
evolving notion of Environmental Human Rights, as I shall explore
in the following sections.
II. RIGHTS
Rights is a slippery term: try to gain a purchase on it, and it
may wriggle out of your grasp. In this section, I shall very briefly
outline different conceptions of "rights," and explain what we
mean when we talk about Environmental Human Rights.
Various classifications of rights exist, yet 'each poses
categories with porous boundaries. Some taxonomies discuss
"generations" of human rights: civil and political rights (e.g., rights
to life, liberty, privacy) are "first generation" rights; economic,
social and cultural rights (e.g., rights to health, education, work)
are "second generation" rights; and "third generation" rights
(including the right to development and the right to environment
considered here) are recent and more controversial.53 In some
classifications, civil and political rights are given priority for
49 Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29
CAL. W. L. REv. 239, 256 (1992). Cohen considers this change "fundamental,
radical, and illegitimate." Id.
50 See, e.g., Owsichek v. State Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488,
494-95 (Alaska 1988). See also Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1984).
5' Araiza, supra note 41, at 402.
52 See infra note 138, Part IV.A.
53 JAVAID REHMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A PRACTICAL
APPROACH 6-7 (2003).
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immediate implementation; economic, social, and cultural rights
are to be implemented progressively, as resources allow; and legal
experts still debate whether third generation rights are actually
rights that pose any obligations.54 Other commentators afford
equal weight to all rights, and argue that all are "universal,
indivisible and interdependent and interrelated." 55  Some
classifications separate "universal" from regional or culturally
relative rights.56 We can also separate rights declared in "soft law"
instruments (e.g., national or regional court decisions, declarations
of political organs, U.N. General Assembly declarations, U.N.
reports from working groups or special rapporteurs) that are
"aspirational" and may not yet bind states, from "hard law," or
rights named in treaties or charters that do bind states, sometimes
whether or not they are parties to the given treaty.57 Yet nations
often act as if soft law norms do bind them, and thus soft law often
elides into hard law. 58
A. Three Types of Rights
In this article, as I discuss environmental rights, I will discern
at least three different meanings of the word, which might
correspond to "rights," rights, and rights. Furthermore, these
meanings are not enclosed by bounded categories; rather, rights
talk implies a sliding scale, so that the categories are more like a
spectrum ranging from fragile, revocable "rights" to inviolable,
supreme rights, with all gradations in between.
"Rights" are legal privileges that may be temporary or
fungible. For example, when I quote the California Constitution
below on the "right to water," I am discussing a limited "right": it
can easily (at least when compared with rights or rights) be
revoked or conditioned. These "rights" correspond to what Sax
14 Id. at 7.
55 Id. (quoting United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (June
25, 1993)).
56 Id. at 5.
57 Id. at 23; RICHARD B. LILLICH, HURST HANNUM, S. JAMES ANAYA, &
DINAH L. SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW,
POLICY, AND PRACTICE 136-37, 142 (2006); Dinah Shelton, Commentary and
Conclusions, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING
NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 449-50, 461-62 (Dinah Shelton
ed., 2000).
58 Shelton, supra note 57, at 461-62.
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refers to as usufructary, a "right" that incorporates the interests of
others and thus a "right" that one does not own "in the same way
he owns his watch or his shoes.,
59
Moving along the spectrum, rights are more fundamental
guarantees. They are the kinds of things constitutions enshrine.
They connote privileges that inhere in citizens because they are
considered essential to the dignity or freedom of each citizen. The
Environmental Human Rights discussed below from Article 24 of
the South African Constitution and derived from Article 21 of the
Indian Constitution fit this notion of rights.
Professor Jona Razzaque explains that constitutionally
guaranteed rights are not absolute: sometimes, limitations may be
placed that are "reasonable and justifiable as it is in an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom;
and will take into account all relevant factors, including the nature
of the right, the importance and purpose of the limitation. 6 °
Nonetheless, these rights confer considerable power on the rights
holder, and once codified, these rights can be realized through
legislation that promotes the rights, through judicial decisions that
reinforce them, and through mobilizing an apparatus of shaming
when rights are violated.
The rights guaranteed by the Public Trust Doctrine-in the
absence of named, constitutional environmental rights-fall
somewhere between "rights" and rights, but closer to the latter.
Absent stipulated constitutional Environmental Human Rights, the
Public Trust Doctrine stands both for the procedural and
substantive rights that citizens may have in the name of certain
environmental resources that are widely understood to belong to
them inherently, and to the corresponding duties that sovereigns'
have to protect and advance those rights. Sax described citizens'
rights to public trust resources not as absolute rights, but "subject
to the reasonable demands of other users.' Furthermore, these
rights are subject to a balancing test "to retain the largest measure
of public use consistent with needful development and
industrialization., 62  This utilitarian argument that public trust
59 Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 9, at 485.
60 JONA RAZZAQUE, PUBLIC INTEREST ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION IN INDIA,
PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH 85 (2004).
61 Sax, DEFENDING, supra note 12, at 162.
62 Id. at 167.
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rights preserve the greatest good for the greatest number of citizens
differs from a notion of rights that confers more absolute
protections for the rights holder.
Where environmental rights are named and guaranteed in
constitutions, the Public Trust Doctrine is sometimes invoked to
support the longstanding notion that the sovereign must protect
what have always been public trust rights but are now hard,
enshrined environmental rights. As we will see, India and South
Africa take the background philosophy of Environmental Human
Rights that the Public Trust Doctrine has stood for, make these
rights explicit in their constitutions, then borrow the Public Trust
Doctrine to add 1,500 years of tradition and two centuries of
American case law to buttress the argument that the government is
obliged to act to protect these Environmental Human Rights.
Fifth Amendment property rights, as interpreted by United
States courts, also fall somewhere between "rights" and rights.
They, too, are subject to a wide range of conditions imposed in the
name of the public good. Even the takings clause-"nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation" 63 -puts explicit conditions on these "rights,"
saying that they can be limited by something as expansively
conceived as the "public good." I will return to this below.
At the far end of the rights spectrum are rights that are
procedurally and substantively inviolable. They are supreme to
any state or national laws. Rights connote absolute privileges that
may not be violated by anyone ever. When consensus coalesces
around a "human right," it "indicates that the rights under
consideration are rights pertaining to human beings by virtue of
their humanity. ' 64 The Preamble to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights affirms that the purpose of the document is to
provide "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family." 65 That is,
these rights belong to all humans inherently.
66
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is aspirational:
its authors and signatories desired that all the rights listed therein
63 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
64 A.H. Robertson, Human Rights in the World, in LILLICH ET AL., supra note
57, at 93.
65 G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
66 LILLICH ET AL., supra note 57, at 2.
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
20081
HeinOnline  -- 16 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 723 2008
N. Y U. ENVIRONMENTAL LA W JOURNAL
would eventually become inviolable rights. Its framers recognized
that human rights evolve, in a slow accretion of layers of
international consensus that may gradually solidify in positive law
(treaties, conventions, declarations, statutes, and the like). As
consensus builds, fungible "rights" become fundamental rights,
and may become inviolable rights.
When consensus forms around protecting something as a
human right, it creates generally nonderogable obligations, i.e.,
obligations that are not voluntary but mandatory. Some human
rights are so universally recognized they become jus cogens
norms, i.e., inviolable human rights from which no citizen,
government official, or nation anywhere may ever derogate. 67 Not
only may a state or individual not violate ajus cogens-right; they
are affirmatively required to advance that right to the best of their
abilities. To refer to a jus cogens right is to say that we have
transcended cultural relativism to find something that embraces all
individuals in all nations.68 When personal entitlements become
enshrined as inviolable rights, they are supreme to any domestic
laws of any nation.69 Those who violate these rights face criminal
prosecution, or a variety of shaming mechanisms meted out by
various international organs, national governments, and NGOs.
Such rights currently comprise an extremely limited set: candidates
for universally acknowledged jus cogens norms include rights to
be free from slavery, genocide, apartheid (or more broadly racial
discrimination), torture, or aggressive warfare conducted not in
self defense.70
67 This principle is codified for state parties in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344.
68 See LILLICH ET AL., supra note 57 at 38.
69 See id. at 103.
70 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102 reporters' note 6 (1987); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 513 (1990). Other sources broaden the potential
candidates for jus cogens norms, e.g., several of the rights enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights such as right to equality, life, liberty,
security fair trial, and presumption of innocence. See REHMAN, supra note 53, at
61. The Ninth Circuit states clearly (in a case involving gross environmental
crimes): "Acts of racial discrimination are violations ofjus cogeng norms." Sarei
v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1209 (9th Cir. 2007). Professor Abate
suggests that "cultural genocide" should be recognized as ajus cogens norm as a
way of forcing nations to act on global warming. Randall S. Abate, Assistant
Professor, Fla. Coastal Law Sch., Presentation at Stanford University
Symposium on Climate Change Liability and the Allocation of Risk, (Feb. 24,
2007).
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B. Environmental Human Rights
Environmental Human Rights have not settled in a location on
the spectrum described above. I believe recognition of global
Environmental Human Rights is trending towards the kind of
fundamental rights implied in the Public Trust Doctrine and
various constitutions. If this momentum continues-as, I believe,
is likely as humans continue to undercut Earth's life support
systems-Environmental Human Rights may become absolute
rights that create non-derogable duties for all private and public
actors.71
In comprehensive reviews of the development of
Environmental Human Rights, Barry Hill et al. find that the "right
to a clean and healthy environment appears to be moving, slowly
but surely, to a higher degree of relevance, ' ' 72 and University of
Wisconsin Law School professor Sumudu Atapattu finds a "slow"
emergence of the idea that humans have a basic right to a healthy
environment. 73  While the U.N. Human Rights Commission
appointed a Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and the
Environment, whose 1994 final report included Draft Principles on
Human Rights and the Environment, 74 the Commission has never
ratified these Draft Principles. 5
Nonetheless, in a 2005 report to the Human Rights
Commission, Earthjustice documents the "repeated and increasing
recognition of a human rights-based approach to environmental
71 See RAZZAQUE, supra note 60, at 87 (discussing the expansion of the
fundamental right to life in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh to include a right to a
healthy/clean environment).
72 Barry E. Hill, Steve Wolfson, & Nicholas Targ, Human Rights and the
Environment: A Synopsis and Some Predictions, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV.
359, 399-400 (2004). Hill et al. evaluate the right in terms of evolution from
soft law to hard law, suggesting that the latter is equivalent to the right being
"enforceable" and thus truly existing. Id. at 361-62. However, as I formulate it,
"rights," rights, and rights are all expressed in various forms in hard law, which
says nothing about how permanent, justiciable, or universal those rights are.
13 Sumudu Atapattu, The Right to a Healthy Life or the Right to Die
Polluted?: The Emergence of a Human Right to a Healthy Environment Under
International Law, 16 TUL. ENVTL L.J. 65, 68 (2002).
74 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of
Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Final Report on Human Rights and the
Environment, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 at 74-75 (July 6, 1994) (prepared
by Fatma Zohra Ksentini).
75 LILLICH ETAL., supra note 57, at 103.
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protection. 76 Nearly all global and regional human rights bodies
have commented or legislated on links between environmental
degradation and internationally protected human rights. 7  117
nations include protection of environmental resources in their
constitutions; 109 specify the right to a healthy environment and/or
the nation's obligation to prevent environmental harm.78 Sixteen
nations name an explicit right to information about health of the
environment and/or about activities that may impair that health.79
Article 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
guarantees that "[a]ll peoples shall have the right to a general
satisfactory environment favorable to their development,, 80 and
Article 11 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention
on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights affirms that "[e]veryone shall have the right to live in a
healthy environment and to have access to basic public services,"
and requires that "[t]he States Parties shall promote the protection,
preservation and improvement of the environment." 8' National
governments' commitments to a clean environment as a human
right expand every year; for example, in 2005, France passed an
"Environment Charter," which proclaims, among other provisions,
that all citizens have a right "to live in an environment which is
balanced and respects their health. 82
The human right to a clean environment may be expressed as
a separate codified right, or as a necessary corollary to other
fundamental rights. The former might name an explicit right to a
healthy environment, clean water, or a functioning ecosystem.
83
But international conventions also recognize that environmental
resources like "clean water" are essential to other protected rights,
76 EARTHJUSTICE, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (2005), available at http://www.earthjustice.org/library/
references/2005 ENVIRONMENTALRIGHTS_REPORTrev.pdf.
77 LILLICH ET AL., supra note 57, at 103.
78 EARTHJUSTICE, supra note 76, at 37.
71 Id. at 38.
80 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 24, June 27, 1981, 21
I.L.M. 58, 63.
81 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, "Protocol of San Salvador" art.
11, Nov. 17, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 161, 165.
82 EARTHJUSTICE, supra note 76, at 38-39.
83 E.g., S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 24(a) ("Everyone has the right to an
environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being.").
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such as the rights to life, health, work, culture, or development.84
For example, the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human
Environment resulted in the Stockholm Declaration, whose
Principle 1 proclaims that "[m]an [sic] has the fundamental right to
freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an
environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-
being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve
the environment for present and future generations." 85 Early in the
movement to establish Environmental Human Rights, Klaus
Toepfer, Executive Director of the United Nations Environment
Programme, declared that:
Human rights cannot be secured in a degraded or polluted
environment. The fundamental right to life is threatened by soil
degradation and deforestation and by exposures to toxic
chemicals, hazardous wastes and contaminated drinking
water.... Environmental conditions clearly help to determine
the extent to which people enjoy their basic rights to life,
health, adequate food and housing, and traditional livelihood
and culture. It is time to recognize that those who pollute or
destroy the natural environment are not just committing a crime
against nature, but are violating human rights as well. 8
In a 1998 International Court of Justice Opinion, Justice
Weermantry notes that:
The protection of the environment is likewise a vital part of
contemporary human rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua non for
numerous human rights such as the right to health and the right
to life itself. It is scarcely necessary to elaborate on this, as
damage to the environment can impair and undermine all the
human rights spoken of in the Universal Declaration and other
human rights instruments.
87
84 EARTHJUSTICE, supra note 76, at 12-13, 31.
85 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Final Declaration, principle
1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (June 16, 1972). Note that Principle 21 can be
read as a contradictory clawback, as it states that "[s]tates have, in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or
of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." Id.
86 LILLICH ET AL., supra note 57, at 61.
87 Case Concerning the Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v.
Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 85, 91-92 (Sept. 25) (separate Opinion of Vice-President
Weeramantry).
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When the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights passed a resolution on
"Promotion of the realization of the right to drinking water and
sanitation," it declared that the right to water is both a separate
human right, and is also a necessary corollary to other human
rights.88 Sounding much like a modem day, expanded formulation
of the Public Trust Doctrine, the resolution averred that because
access to clean water is a fundamental human right, neither public
nor private entities could restrict access to drinking water, and
public authorities had an affirmative duty to maintain access to
drinking water for all citizens.89
As in the Public Trust Doctrine, this approach to
environmental protection is not about rights of the environment,
but rights of humans to various environmental protections.9" This
may include provisions for future generations to enjoy certain
rights, or even to ensure the very survival of future generations:
according to Professor Dinah Shelton, "[a] right to environment
thus implies significant, constant duties toward persons not yet
bom."91  While some biocentric or ecocentric environmental
activists may use either the Public Trust Doctrine or
Environmental Human Rights to protect ecological assets
themselves from human despoliation, both doctrines are
fundamentally homocentric. 92  Furthermore, some of the fights
subsumed under the aegis of Environmental Human Rights-e.g.,
the right to development, or the right to clean water-may come
into conflict with other "intrinsic" rights of the natural world, or
other approaches to preserving nature for nature's own sake.
93
88 EARTHJUSTICE, supra note 76, at 12.
89 Id.
90 Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to
Environment, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103, 117 (1991).
91 Id. at 134; see, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALAWI ch. III,
art. 13(d)(iii) ("accord[s] full recognition to the rights of future generations by
means of environmental protection and the sustainable development of natural
resources").
92 See Shelton, supra note 90, at 109, 117. Atapattu sees the rights approach
as complementing an ecocentric approach, because it "gives the victims of
environmental abuse another avenue to seek redress. Atapattu, supra note 73, at
67. For some critiques of this homocentric approach see id. at 71-72, 78.
93 Shelton, supra note 90, at 109; Atapattu, supra note 73, at 117-18. For a
full treatment of "intergenerational equity," the idea that each generation inherits
a legacy it holds as a public trust for generations to come, see EDITH BROWN
WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON
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Cases brought under the aegis of a human rights based
approach to prevent environmental degradation have also
emphasized rights of information and participation. 94  While
Shelton observes that naming environmental "[i]ndividual rights
may thus significantly limit the political will of a democratic
majority, as well as a dictatorial minority," 95 we can also see this
as promoting an expansive view of democracy. Recall that Joseph
Sax's vision for the Public Trust Doctrine included a fundamental
procedural right for affected members of the public to appeal
directly government decisions that compromised resources held in
the public trust, to protect trust resources held for the majority
from incursions by a minority.96 Various declarations and statutes
promoting Environmental Human Rights have stressed similar
procedural rights, including, for example, a right to information
(both a right to request information and an affirmative duty of
governments to provide information) when government bodies
make decisions affecting the environment.
97
Thus often linked to a fundamental environmental human
right we find the right to participate in decisions affecting those
rights, and to appeal decisions if one's rights have been abridged.
Currently signed by 40 nations as well as the European
Community, the United Nation's Economic Commission for
Europe's Aarhus Convention for "Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters" is the most extensive elaboration of this
right. Its preamble declares that "every person has the right to live
in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being,
and the duty, both individually and in association with others, to
protect and improve the environment for the benefit of present and
future generations." 98  The Aarhus Convention links the
fundamental right to a clean environment with the fundamental
right to acquire information about environmental matters, to
participate in decision-making on those matters, and to vindicate
PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1992).
94 LILLICH ETAL., supra note 57, at 103.
95 Shelton, supra note 90, at 107.
96 See Sax, DEFENDING, supra note 12, at 235.
97 EARTHJUSTICE, supra note 76, at 7.
98 Convention for Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 2161
U.N.T.S. 450, 450, available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/
cep43e.pdf. See also EARTHJUSTICE, supra note 76, at 16.
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
20081
HeinOnline  -- 16 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 729 2008
N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAWJOURNAL
violations of environmental rights.99
Where Environmental Human Rights are justiciable (as in
South Africa and India, below), individuals may have standing to
bring cases when their own environmental rights have been
violated.'00 Outsiders are also permitted-sometimes required-to
bring cases on behalf of those who lack resources or freedoms to
vindicate their own rights.101 Not only may individuals whose
rights are abridged challenge these actions; other nation states or
transnational actors (e.g., the UN, intraregional organizations,
NGOs) may actively intervene against national, corporate, or
private actors to protect Environmental Human Rights. 0 2  For
example, in the Niger River delta, international NGOs forced
Nigeria to take measures (e.g., stop attacks on
local communities, conduct investigations, compensate victims,
prepare environmental, and social impact assessments) to remedy
Environmental Human Rights violations from oil exploration.'0 3
The African Human Rights Commission explicitly thanked the
NGOs for bringing the suit.' 
04
C. The United States and Environmental Human Rights
The United States offers no constitutionally protected right to
the environment, despite three unsuccessful amendment attempts
between 1967-1970, and renewed efforts in 2003.105 However, six
states do guarantee their citizens a right to a clean environment,1
0 6
and I will explain below how this right has been incorporated in
99 EARTHJUSTICE, supra note 76, at 16.
" LILLICH ET AL., supra note 57, at 100.
10 See Jonas Ebbesson, Public Participation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 694 (Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunde, &
Ellen Hey, eds., 2007); LILLICH ET AL., supra note 57, at 100. See, e.g., infra
note 103.
102 LILLICH ETAL., supra note 57, at 103; see Ebbesson, supra note 101.
103 Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. v. Nigeria, African Comm'n on Human &
Peoples' Rights, Comm. No. 155/96 (2001), available at http://www.umn.edu/
humanrts/africa/comcases/155-96.html.
'04 Id. 49.
105 David W. Orr, Law of the Land, ORION, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 19, 22. In
2003, Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr. introduced a constitutional amendment respecting "a
right to a clean, safe, and sustainable environment." H.R.J. Res. 33, 108th Cong.
(2003).
106 See Araiza, supra note 41, at 445. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9; ILL. CONST.
art. XI, § 2; MASS. CONST. amend. XLIX; MONT. CONST.art. II, § 3; PA. CONST.
art. 1, § 27; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
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the courts of Pennsylvania, the state with the most elaborately
developed jurisprudence on the right to a healthy environment.
The courts of many nations have universal jurisdiction to hear
violations of generally recognized principles of human rights, even
if those violations occur outside the nation's borders. This
jurisdiction is usually reserved for violations of the most serious
human rights crimes, considered to undermine the international
legal order if left unremedied. 10 7  The United States offers no
similar universal jurisdiction. Despite the oft-cited quote from the
chestnut Paquete Habana case that "[i]nternational law is part of
our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination,"'
0 8
plaintiffs seldom invoke international law in United States courts,
and the courts have rarely held that an American entity violating
jus cogens norms may be liable without empowering domestic
legislation.109  That is to say, rights widely recognized in
international law do not by themselves create a right of action in
the United States.
Environmental Human Rights are most likely to play out at
the United States national level through application of the Alien
Tort Statute of 1790, which has been held to create specific causes
of action in United *States federal courts for crimes that are
universally recognized violations of human rights committed
against aliens in foreign locations, when the perpetrator is found
and served in the United States." 0 Originally created to allow
courts to hear cases of piracy on the high seas, modem day crimes
actionable under the Alien Tort Statute must be for crimes
analogous to piracy, i.e., violations of rights that are "universally
accepted norms of the international law of human rights""1' as
determined through "the works of jurists," "general usage and
107 Diane Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with
Democratic Principles, GEO. L.J. 1057, 1059-60 (2004); Menno Kamminga,
Lessons Learned from the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross
Human Rights Offenses, 23 HUM. RTs. Q. 940, 943. Thus violations of
economic, social, and cultural rights tend not to be subject to universal
jurisdiction.
08 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
109 See Joan Fitzpatrick, The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing
International Human Rights Law, in LILLICH ET AL., supra note 57, at 477-78.
110 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
... Id. at 878.
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practice of nations," or "judicial decisions recognizing and
enforcing that law."' 1 2 These crimes must have a high degree of
specificity and must be broadly adhered to by nations.' 
13
Broad consensus holds that these crimes include genocide,
slavery, torture, and perhaps apartheid and aggressive warfare.
114
However, the court in Sosa specifically, did not limit crimes
actionable under the Alien Tort Statute to these crimes. 1 5 U.S.
courts have, up until recently, not ruled environmental crimes as
justiciable under the Alien Tort Statute; for example, in a case
alleging personal injuries from pollution from a U.S. mining
operation in Peru, a federal court held that rights to life and health
are not definite enough to constitute a universally recognized norm
of international law. 1 6  However, in August 2006, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that certain environmental harms-
specifically racially discriminatory environmental harms and
violations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea-could meet the Sosa court's definitions for crimes that are
actionable under the Alien Tort Statute.' 
7
Thus international consensus consolidating around
Environmental Human Rights could create powerful new legal
tools in the United States, either through the Alien Tort Statute, or
possibly through precedent establishing violations of jus cogens
norms as actionable in courts. Below I Will discuss the
implications for recognition of Environmental Human Rights for
United States notions of "private property" and for what
constitutes a taking.
III. SYNTHESIS AND SYNERGY BETWEEN THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE AND ENVIRONMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS
The Public Trust Doctrine is a forerunner of the movement to
112 Id. at 880.
113 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
114 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, § 102 reporters' note 6.
"5 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
116 Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 160 (2d Cir. 2003).
117 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006). In a
rehearing, the court held that racial discrimination was ajus cogens norm. Sarei
v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1209 (9th Cir., 2007). The rehearing assumed
"that UNCLOS reflects customary international law norms actionable under the
ATCA," even if they are not yet clearlyjus cogens norms. Id. at 1210.
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guarantee certain environmental rights as fundamental human
rights. The Public Trust Doctrine is both an appealing idea that
lays the groundwork for Environmental Human Rights, and a
venerable legal doctrine that has historically managed to protect
certain resources for public use, and may still be called upon to
protect those resources in the name of Environmental Human
Rights. Justinian's intuition about where the sovereign fit in the
relationship between his citizens and his Empire's natural
resources finds new, cogent, urgent expression in Environmental
Human Rights. In Sax's justification of the Public Trust Doctrine,
some public interests in the environment are intrinsically
important, the gifts of nature's bounty ought not be constrained for
private use, and some uses of nature are intrinsically
inappropriate.' 18 Those who advocate for Environmental Human
Rights cite these same justifications, too. Clean water or clean air
or functioning ecosystems are rights because human life cannot
exist without them; these gifts of nature's bounty ought not be
traded away for the use of private entities at the expense of what is
essential to every single human's life.
But I believe that Environmental Human Rights is more than
just putting old Public Trust Doctrine wine in gleaming new
bottles. Once we label something as a fundamental right or an
inviolable right, it is much less likely to come up short in a
balancing test. Sax indicates that Public Trust Doctrine "rights"
can be traded away, and even constitutionally based rights
sometimes can be lost. The more fundamental the right is
considered, the more nonderogable are duties to protect those
rights, and the heavier the weight of international shaming falls
upon the violator. Fulfillment of these rights supervenes any
legislation that conflicts with such fulfillment.
Environmental Human Rights create more duties of each
individual and the sovereigns who serve them not only not to usurp
resources that are the object of these rights, but to affirmatively
protect the natural objects and processes that form the basis of the
rights. This means greater legislative and executive impetus to
protect and advance these rights, and heightened judicial scrutiny
when fundamental rights are violated. And Environmental Human
Rights dramatically expand the body of plaintiffs, defendants, and
intervenors who may vindicate the right or be charged with
118 See Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 9, at 484-85.
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abridging the right. While the Public Trust Doctrine's reach tends
to be limited to the boundaries of a state or nation, Environmental
Human Rights reach across national boundaries in terms of who
may bring claims against which violators, who may intervene to
vindicate those rights, and who can have jurisdiction to hear
violations of fundamental rights.
Under the Public Trust Doctrine, certain resources are
understood to remain in public hands and cannot be conveyed to
private uses. This idea has skulked about for 1500 years and has
spread throughout common law and civil law traditions. A
growing body of Public Trust Doctrine case law has accreted since
the 19th century in the United States. Thus private property
owners ought to be on notice that they may not arrogate public
trust environmental resources. As an emerging norm in customary
international law that is codified- in ever more numerous
documents in more and more corners of the world, Environmental
Human Rights have enormous potential to create new prohibitions
on what a private property owner may do with her land. It may not
matter that a private property owner should be on notice (or
whether or not she had reasonable "investment-backed
expectations"1 19) about what she can do with her land.
If environmental rights become constitutionally or statutorily
protected, if they are acknowledged as customary international
law, or if they come to be taken as seriously as other jus cogens
rights (e.g., rights to be free from torture or slavery), they can
proscribe uses of private property that conflict with fulfilling those
rights. And some of these rights-the right to clean water, the right
to a healthy environment-are so sweeping they could
dramatically constrain what an "owner" can do in the name of
private property. If taken seriously, could a farmer continue to
spray pesticides or allow topsoil erosion if this pollutes the water I
drink or the air I breathe? Could factories continue to emit any
kind of toxics or emit greenhouse gases?
In my Conclusion, I will speculate on the future of private
property and "takings" of such property. I will do so in light of
how the synergism between the Public Trust Doctrine and
Environmental Human Rights has played out in the courts and
legislatures of four disparate jurisdictions: India, South Africa,
California, and Pennsylvania. In each, advocates and judges have
119 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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marshaled the two doctrines as legal resources that help stake out
the public's right to environmental resources and the government's
obligations to steward those resources.
A. India
Article 21 of India's constitution declares: "No person shall
be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law."1 20  Laws that conflict with or
abridge fundamental rights named in the constitution are voided.'
21
Citizens are allowed to challenge violations of these rights directly,
and in fact citizen suits are the most rapid means to challenge
actions that threaten fundamental rights.' 22 In India, Judges have
taken these substantive and procedural rights seriously and have
buttressed them by establishing the Public Trust Doctrine to secure
powerful protections for citizens' Environmental Human Rights.
While India's constitution does not explicitly provide for
Environmental Human Rights, Indian courts have gone further
than almost any in naming environmental rights that serve the
fundamental right to life.'23 In India, claims that impinge on
Article 21's fundamental right to life include various challenges
where ecosystems have been impaired.12 4 India's Supreme Court
stopped unauthorized mining causing environmental damage,
holding that this "is a price that has to be paid for protecting and
safeguarding the right of the people to live in a healthy
environment with minimal disturbance of ecological balance.
125
When a government agency action threatened a local fresh water
source, the High Court of Kerala held that government "cannot be
permitted to function in such a manner as to make inroads into the
fundamental right under Art. 21.... [T]he right to sweet water
and the right to free air are attributes of the right to life, for these
are the basic elements which sustain life itself."' 126  In a case
120 INDIA CONST. art. 21.
121 INDIA CONST. art. 13(2).
122 RAZZAQUE, supra note 60, at 63, 67.123 Hill et al., supra note 72, at 382.
124 Neal A. Kemkar, Environmental Peacemaking: Ending Conflict Between
India and Pakistan on the Siachen Glacier Through the Creation of a
Transboundary Peace Park, 25 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 67, 86 (2006).
125 Rural Litig. & Entitlement Kendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1985
S.C. 652, 656 (India).
126 Attakoya Thangal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1990 K.L.T. 580 7 (KeralaH.C.).
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upholding a statute that allows India to pursue justice following the
Bhopal disaster, the Supreme Court further consolidated the link
between Article 21's right to life and the right to a clean
environment. 1
27
In 1997, the landmark case of M. C. Mehta vs. Kamal Nath
conjured up the Public Trust Doctrine in India.128 In that case, the
Minister of the Environment (respondent here) impermissibly
allowed a motel to be built at the mouth of a river, and
impermissibly allowed the motel to change the course of the river
(which created subsequent flooding in nearby villages) in violation
of the Public Trust Doctrine-which hadn't explicitly existed
before this case. 29 Before invoking the Public Trust Doctrine, the
court alludes to:
the classic struggle between those members of the public who
would preserve our rivers, forests, parks and open lands in their
pristine purity and those charged with administrative
responsibilities who, under the pressures of the changing needs
of an increasingly complex society, find it necessary to
encroach to some extent upon open lands heretofore considered
inviolate to change.
130
In this case, the court summons up the Public Trust Doctrine
by first saying "[t]he notion that the public has a right to expect
certain lands and natural areas to retain their natural characteristic
is finding its way into the law of the land.' 13 1 To justify this
notion, the court cites excerpts from United States law review
articles promoting a new kind of natural law exigency for
protecting environmental resources in the name of protecting
fundamental human rights.'3 2  For example, the court cites a
lengthy passage from a Harvard Environmental Law Review
article: "[H]uman activity finds in the natural world its external
limits. In short, the environment imposes constraints on our
freedom; these constraints are not the product of value choices but
of the scientific imperative of the environment's limitations."'
33
127 Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1480, 1551 (India).
128 1997 1 S.C.C. 388, 388 (India).
129 Id.
130 Id. at 35.
Id. at 23.
E,g., id. at 23.
33 Id. (citing David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A
Call for Judicial Protection of the Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical
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The court then revisits Justinian's notion of the Public Trust
Doctrine, as explained by Sax, including his exegesis of more than
a half dozen seminal cases of United States law that invoked and
reinvigorated the Public Trust Doctrine. 134 The court concludes:
Our legal system-based on English common law -includes
the public trust doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The State is
the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant
for public use and enjoyment. Public at large is the beneficiary
of the sea-shore, running waters, airs, forests and ecologically
fragile lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty to
protect the natural resources. These resources meant for public
use cannot be converted into private ownership. 1
35
And thus the "esthetic use and the pristine glory of the natural
resources, the environment and the eco-systems of our country
cannot be permitted to be eroded for private, commercial or any
other use unless the courts find it necessary, in good faith, for the
public goods and in public interest to encroach upon the said
resources." 136 The court declares that "[t]he Public Trust Doctrine
as discussed by us in this judgment is a part of the law of the
land."
' 137
In MI. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu, the Indian
Supreme Court subsequently hitched the Public Trust Doctrine to
the constitutionally guaranteed right to life.138 The court held that
a public park and market are public trust resources that may not be
replaced with a shopping complex.1 39 Citing the precedent of MC.
Mehta, the court reasserted that the Public Trust Doctrine is part of
Indian law, 140 and thus ordered the appellant to restore the park
that it had destroyed when it (and the government agency that
permitted its actions) improperly violated the public trust.' 4' The
park in a crowded area is of "historical importance and
environmental necessity."'142 To allow the construction would
Resources. 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 311 (1988)).
114 Id. at 24-25.
135 Mehta, (1997) 1 S.C.C. at 34.
136 Id. at 35.
137 Id. at 39.
138 See M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu, 1999 S.C.C. 464
(India).
139 Id.
140 Id. at 506.
141 Id. at 530.
142 Id. at 466.
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 16 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 737 2008
N. Y. U. ENVIRONMENTAL LA W JOURNAL
mean that citizens "would be deprived of the quality of life to
which they are entitled under the law.', 143 Because the
government's Development Authority was the trustee of the park,
it had violated "the doctrine of public trust, which [is] applicable in
India."' 144 The government authority was obliged to manage this
park for the public good, and it "has deprived itself of its
obligatory duties which cannot be permitted."'
145
The court noted that "this public trust doctrine in our country,
it would appear, has grown from Article 21 of the Constitution."
146
That is to say, in India, the Public Trust Doctrine was invoked
anew specifically to protect the fundamental human rights
enshrined in the Indian Constitution.
Here, then, the Indian Supreme Court avers that the actions of
the government and the private party appellant violated the right to
life guaranteed in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, and the
government agency has committed these violations by violating
India's Public Trust Doctrine. Drawing on the Illinois Central
decision to explain Sax's central tenet of the Public Trust Doctrine,
the Indian court recites that "[w]hen a state holds a resource which
is available for the free use of the general public, a court will look
with considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct
which is calculated either to reallocate, the resource to more
restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of
private parties."
' 147
Subsequent Indian litigation has affirmed the Public Trust
Doctrine's relevance in Indian law. For example, the High Court
of Jammu & Kashmir allowed a manufacturing plant to be
constructed, but only if the regional government observed its
Public Trust Doctrine duties to ensure that all possible pollution
safeguards were implemented. 148 The decision once again said
that Article 21 of the constitution required that the government
observe its public trust duties, for the "public has a right to expect
certain lands and natural areas to retain their natural
141 Id. at 480.
.144 Id. at 506.
141 Id. at 506-07.
146 Id. at 518.
147 Id. at 518.
148 Th. Majra Singh v. Indian Oil Co., A.I.R. 1999 J & K 81, 83 excerpted in
RAZZAQUE, supra note 60, at 105.
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characteristics."' 149 The judgment also extended the scope of the
Public Trust Doctrine, as "there can be no dispute that the State is
under an obligation to see that forests, lakes and wildlife and
environment are duly protected."' 50
Even after reading these cases and various interpretations
thereof, I do not understand how exactly the Indian Supreme Court
pulled off this maneuver. The decisions do not reveal whether the
judges are saying this Public Trust Doctrine has always been a part
of Indian law, or whether it is a new provision. Mostly they seem
to say that United States law has always found the Public Trust
Doctrine to be part of its common law heritage as a British colony,
and it should obtain in India, too. What is clear, however, is that
the court felt the Public Trust Doctrine was necessary to bolster its
demands on the government to advance constitutionally protected
rights.
It also appears that putting the Public Trust Doctrine in
service of constitutionally guaranteed environmental rights puts
not only new strictures on government, but also places new
constraints on private property rights in India. Those constraints
could be cast as a sextuple threat to Indian private property rights.
First, the Indian Constitution mandates a fundamental right to life.
Second, two decades and dozens of court cases interpret this
constitutionally provided right to mean that environmental harms
themselves are proscribed in order to serve the fundamental right
to life. Third, to prohibit private acts that threaten environmental
resources essential to safeguard the right to life, the Indian
Supreme Court has repeatedly cited the "polluter pays principle
and the precautionary principle" as emerging norms of
international environmental law.' 15  Fourth, the Public Trust
Doctrine is asserted to buttress the government's ineluctable
responsibility to protect the right to life and the ancillary rights that
serve the fundamental right. Fifth, private rights of action against
private or government parties are permitted to vindicate the
fundamental and corollary rights. Finally, the Indian Constitution
requires an affirmative "fundamental duty" of every citizen of
India "to protect and improve the natural environment including
141 Id. at 82.
150 Id.
151 S. MURALIDHAR, INT'L ENVTL. LAW RESEARCH CTR., THE RIGHT TO
WATER: AN OVERVIEW OF THE INDIAN LEGAL REGIME 6-7 (2006), available at
http://www.ielrc.org/content/a06O4.pdf (providing an overview of these cases).
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forests, lakes, rivers, wild life, and to have compassion for living
creatures.' 52  While a thorough examination of Indian private
property rights is beyond the scope of this article, the combination
of court-enshrined corollary environmental rights in service of
fundamental right to life when accompanied with a decade-old
reinvention of the Public Trust Doctrine means that whatever
"rights" private property owners had before in India are now cast
in a new, circumscribed way.
B. South Africa
The constitution of the Republic of South Africa, ratified in
1996 after a long era of brutal, systemic racial oppression, is
perhaps the most progressive constitution in the world today in
terms of guaranteeing an expansive set of fundamental human
rights, and in naming affirmative duties of a government to
advance those rights. 153  Unlike in India, The Bill of Rights
includes Section 24's explicit, fundamental environmental rights:
Everyone has the right: a) to an environment that is not
harmful to their health or well-being; and b) to have the
environment protected, for the benefit of present and future
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures
that: i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; ii) promote
conservation; and iii) secure ecologically sustainable development
and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic
and social development.
154
The constitution further guarantees the right to "sufficient
food and water." 155 Just as Supreme Court Justices did in India,
South Africa's legislators have reintroduced the Public Trust
Doctrine as part of national law, and as such have expanded
dramatically the Environmental Human Rights of the public at the
expense of individual rights of private property owners.
As separate rights, but also rights used to access other
fundamental rights, all South Africans have the rights of "[a]ccess
to information,"' 5 6 "[j]ust administrative action," 157 and "[a]ccess
152 INDIA CONST. art. 51A(g).
153 See Jan Glazewski, The Rule of Law: Opportunities for Environmental
Justice in the New Democratic Legal Order, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN
SOUTH AFRICA 171-98 (David A. McDonald ed., 2001).
154 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 24.
155 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 27(1)(b).
156 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 32.
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to courts."'' 58 The constitution gives broad standing to anyone to
stake a claim when their constitutionally codified rights have been
violated; this may be "anyone acting in their own interest,"
"anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their
own name," "anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a
group or class of persons," "anyone acting in the public interest,"
or "an association acting in the interest of its members."
' 159
Various court decisions have held that all of these rights are to
be read holistically; i.e., each right must be situated
nonhierarchically in the context of all the rights named in the
constitution and all rights should be interpreted through the
national values the constitution was designed to promote.' 
60
The case The Government of the Republic of South Africa v.
Irene Grootboom illustrates the broad reach of these fundamental
rights.' 6' Desperately poor citizens were able directly to appeal
their lack of housing, food, and water-which resulted in a "land
invasion" by those attempting to secure basic needs-and the
government's abdication of its fundamental duties to provide them
with these fundamental rights.' 62 The court begins by noting the
"harsh reality that the Constitution's promise of dignity and
equality for all remains for many a distant dream."'163 Noting that
Section 7(2) of the constitution "requires the state 'to respect,
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights' and the
courts are constitutionally bound to ensure that they are protected
and fulfilled," the court rules that it is beyond question that all the
rights of the constitution are justiciable, and the only question
remaining is "how to enforce them in a given case."' 64 The court
explores "[t]he concept of minimum core obligation" where
"[e]ach right has a 'minimum essential level' that must be satisfied
157 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 33.
158 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 34.
1 9 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 38.
160 Robyn Stein, Water Law in a Democratic South Africa: A Country Case
Study Examining the Introduction of a Public Rights System, 83 TEX. L. REV.
2167, 2170-71 (2004); see The Gov't of the Republic of South Africa & Others v
Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 19 (S. Aft.) (a set of listed
"rights need to be considered in the context of the cluster of socio-economic
rights enshrined in the Constitution").
"' 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (S. Afr.).
62 Id. 2, 93.
163 Id. 2.
'6 Id. 20.
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by the states parties. '' 65
The government's obligations to fulfill these rights are
manifold. Legislation alone is not enough and must be "supported
by appropriate, well-directed policies and programmes," which
themselves "must also be reasonably implemented."' 166 While the
court acknowledges that these actions may be limited by available
resources, the "nationwide housing programme falls short of
obligations imposed upon national government to the extent that it
fails to recognize that the state must provide for relief for those in
desperate need."'' 67 The court holds that the government is obliged
"to provide access to housing, health-care, sufficient food and
water, and social security to those unable to support themselves
and their dependants. The state must also foster conditions to
enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis."'
' 68
The court appoints the Human Rights Commission, an amicus in
the case, to monitor progress in meeting these goals, and to report
back on results. 169 While the court acknowledges the "extremely
difficult task for the state to meet these obligations in the
conditions that prevail in our country," the judge concludes: "I
stress, however, that despite all these qualifications, these are
rights, and the Constitution obliges the state to give effect to
them."
170
This judgment implies that the state must affirmatively
address and make progress towards achieving all the fundamental
rights, including the environmental rights. 171 Section 24(a) notes
that everyone has a right to an environment that is not only not
harmful to their "health" but to their "well-being.' ' 172 While
"health" is covered elsewhere in the constitution, one can claim
many other aspects of one's "well-being" that may be harmed
when one's environment is harmed. Professor Jan Glazewski
writes: "In the environmental context, the possibilities suggested
by a right to well-being are exciting, but potentially limitless. The







171 Stein confirms this; supra note 160, at 2171-72.
172 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 24(a).
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concern, namely a sense of environmental integrity; a sense that
we ought to utilize the environment in a morally responsible and
ethical manner."'' 73  He and other scholars anticipate dramatic
expansions of litigation in the name of vindicating the fundamental
environmental rights. 1
74
In 1998, to fulfill its constitutionally mandated affirmative
duties to secure the right to water, supported here by the
constitutionally mandated rights of "[a]ccess to information,"
"[j]ust administrative action," and "[a]ccess to courts," 175 South
Africa passed a National Water Act.' 76 Decades of racial apartheid
left over 10 million South Africans without access to clean, safe
water and over 20 million South Africans without adequate
sanitation. 177  The National Water Act requires distribution of
basic water supplies to fulfill the constitutionally mandated right to
water, but also requires the government to fulfill the
constitutionally mandated duties to promote conservation and
prevent ecological degradation through the mechanism of an
environmental "reserve," which conserves water for future human
and current nonhuman use. 1
78
As part of the National Water Act, in the same year that
India's Supreme Court mandated its Public Trust Doctrine, the
South African government disinterred its own moribund Public
Trust Doctrine, which had been buried through decades of
apartheid regimes whose leaders felt no need to act to preserve
resources for the majority of the public. 179  The National
Government is "the public trustee of the nation's water sources"
and must "ensure that water is protected, used, developed,
conserved, managed and controlled in a sustainable and equitable
manner, for the benefit of all persons and in accordance with its
173 Glazewski, supra note 153, at 176.
174 Id. at 193.
175 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 §§ 32-34.
176 National Water Act 36 of 1998 (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.elaw.org/resources/text.asp?ID=l 153. The Preamble to the Act
parallels language in the Bill of Rights, which states that "[e]veryone has the
right to have access to... sufficient.., water." S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 27(1).
177 DEP'T OF WATER AFFAIRS & FORESTRY, S. AFR., WHITE PAPER ON A
NATIONAL WATER POLICY FOR SOUTH AFRICA § 2.2.3 (1997) [hereinafter WHITE
PAPER], available at http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Policies/nwpwp.pdf.
178 National Water Act §§ 16-18.
179 Stein, supra note 160, at 2173.
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constitutional mandate."'
180
The White Paper that led to the National Water Law prepared
the foundation for reinstituting the Public Trust Doctrine. As
background, the Paper recites that:
In Roman law (on which South African law is based) rivers
were seen as being resources which belonged to the nation as a
whole and were available for common use by all citizens, but
which were controlled by the state in the public interest. These
principles fitted in well with African customary law which saw
water as a common good used in the interest of the
community.
18 1
The White Paper further proclaims that:
The recognition of Government's role as custodian of the
'public trust' in managing, protecting and determining the
proper use of South Africa's water resources ... is a central
part of the new approach to water management. As such it will
be the foundation of the new water law. The main idea of the
public trust is that the national Government has a duty to
regulate water use for the benefit of all South Africans, in a way
which takes into account the public nature of water resources
and the need to make sure that there is fair access to these
resources. The central part of this is to make sure that these
scarce resources are beneficially used in the public interest.182
The White Paper refers to United States court precedents
overturning private water rights "on the grounds that water
remains subject to the public trust," confirming the development of
the public trust as including "the state's duty to protect the
people's common heritage of rivers, streams, lakes, marshlands,
tidelands and the sea-shore.' 83 The authors nonetheless state that
"the idea of water as a public good will be redeveloped into a
doctrine of public trust which is uniquely South African ... ",,1 84
This means, among other things, that riparian allocations will not
180 National Water Act § 3(1).
181 WHITE PAPER, supra note 177, § 5.1.1.
182 Id. § 5.1.2.
183 id.
184 Id. South Africa reaffirmed the Public Trust Doctrine in the National
Environmental Management Act, which declares that the "environment is held
in public trust for the people. [T]he beneficial use of environmental resources
must serve the public interest and the environment must be protected as the
people's common heritage." Act 107 of 1998 Ch.1, § 2(4)(o), available at
http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1998/a 107-98.pdf.
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carry permanent property rights, but will be "time limited" to
allow for both the ebbs and flows of natural processes and the
"evolving socio-economic demands placed on them."'' 85 That is to
say, the Public Trust Doctrine continues to allow reasonable use by
riparians, but that use is always subject to government
redistribution schemes. 186 Furthermore, "[c]laims, allocations and
uses which are not beneficial in the public interest, have no basis
in the common law, nor will they be recognized under the new
law."'1 87 New allocations may be "redressing the results of past
racial discrimination."'
' 88
Thus riparian rights will be reallotted to emphasize uses that
help fulfill constitutional mandates for fundamental human rights,
serve the public interest, and ameliorate allotments unjustly given
during apartheid. When combined with the "Just Administration,"
expanded standing, and other procedural rights codified in the
constitution, the Public Trust Doctrine's "uniquely South African"
twist comes close to marrying Joseph Sax's vision of intertwined
substantive and procedural rights while curtailing certain property
"rights" in water.'
The policy adopted by South Africa to deliver "Free Basic
Water" 189 to all its citizens is not without problems: allocated
amounts are low (25 liters/day), the system is underfinanced, some
local governments turn to profit-making corporations to deliver
basic services, and despite the fact that local authorities are
supposed to be guided by "compassion" in assessing rates, some
poor families cannot afford the price.1 90 Nonetheless, between the
time the constitution was implemented in 1996 and 2002, South
Africa managed to provide free basic water supplies to 27 million
(of its approximately 44 million) people, and plans to achieve full
compliance with their constitutionally mandated duty by providing
185 WHITE PAPER, supra note 177, § 5.1.2.
186 Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to
Water, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 957, 999 (1999).
187 WHITE PAPER, supra note 177, § 5.1.3.
188 Id.
189 DEP'T OF WATER AFFAIRS & FORESTRY, S. AFR., FREE BASIC WATER
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY (VERSION 2) 3 (2002), available at
http://www.dwaf.govza/Documents/FBWFBWlmplementStrategyAug2OO2.pdf.
190 ALIX GOWLLAND-GUALTIERI, INT'L ENVTL. LAW RESEARCH CTR., SOUTH
AFRICA'S WATER LAW AND POLICY FRAMEWORK: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RIGHT
TO WATER 5-8, 9 (2007).
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free basic water to the entire population by 2009. '
It seems to me that South Africa reinvented the Public Trust
Doctrine for several reasons. First, as we saw in India, the Public
Trust Doctrine provides additional ideological and legal support
for the government's assertion of control over environmental
resources to which a nation's citizens have new, constitutionally
mandated, and judicially reinforced fundamental human rights. In
South Africa, the Public Trust Doctrine helps effectuate citizens'
constitutional right to "[j]ust administrative action" (i.e.,
"[e]veryone has the right to administrative action that is lawful,
reasonable, and procedurally fair"192). The Public Trust Doctrine
provides international legal justification for newly expanded
responsibilities and provides a body of international legal decisions
to help guide a new democracy on the parameters and pitfalls of
how government must act as public trustee. Asserting the Public
Trust Doctrine helps avoid estoppel-or takings-arguments for
those citizens whose current water allocations will be revoked:
those allocations may be illegitimate not only because they were
given under an illegal apartheid system, but because that system
itself revoked the use of the Public Trust Doctrine, which ought
always to have existed as common law in South Africa's Roman-
derived legal system. By declaring that in South Africa, the Public
Trust Doctrine always obtained-or always ought to have
obtained-the current government can now say that 'those
in power during the apartheid years impermissibly abandoned
their duties as public trustee. The Public Trust Doctrine thus
buttresses constitutionally required government action to protect
constitutionally guaranteed fundamental environmental rights.
Implementing the Public Trust Doctrine may constrain private
property ownership and actions as well. The constitution supports
private property rights, and the government can only take property
"for a public purpose or in the public interest," "subject to
compensation;" however, compensation may be limited by "the
history of the acquisition and use of the property.' 93 Because the
"public interest includes the nation's commitment to land reform,
and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's
191 Bluemel, supra note 186, at 979.
192 S. AFR CONST, 1996 § 33.
193 S. AFR CONST. 1996 § 25.
Imaged with Permission from-N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
[Volume 16
HeinOnline  -- 16 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 746 2008
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
natural resources,"'1 94 owners who acquired private property
illegally during apartheid may have no rights to keep that property,
as "[n]o provision of this section may impede the state from taking
legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and related
reform, in order to redress the results of past racial
discrimination."' 95 Furthermore, individuals have duties to protect
fundamental environmental rights of their fellow citizens, and
citizens have standing to challenge private actions that violate
those environmental rights. The only case I have found to make
this connection occurred while the interim constitution was
supreme law. The court found that incineration at a sawmill
resulted in "generation of smoke in these circumstances...
[which] is an infringement of rights of the respondent's neighbours
to 'an environment which is not detrimental to their health or well-
being' enshrined in the Interim Constitution."' 96  According to
Glazewski, by so doing, the judge enshrined into law the maxim
that one should "use your property in a way which does not harm
another." 1
9 7
In South Africa, private property rights are circumscribed by
requirements that owners adhere to the public trust, by new duties
to promote fundamental human rights, and by the extent to which
the property rights were fairly distributed or unfairly arrogated
during an unjust system of racial oppression. Capricious water
supplies needed to serve a population growing in size and needs-
a supply the government must manage as public trustee to fulfill
fundamental human rights--can only diminish the "rights"
property holders currently enjoy. Compensation-akin to that paid
for a taking-is available only when renewals are denied to those
reapplying for licenses for uses that would, in fact, be beneficial to
the public (and that were not impermissibly granted in the first
place). When one adds up the constitutionally enshrined
environmental rights, the duties the constitution imposes on the
government, the public trust rights written into the National Water
Act, and the aggressive decisions handed down by the courts in
interpreting the constitution and resulting statutes, private property
rights face a shrinking future in South Africa.
194 S. AFR CONST. 1996 § 25(4)(a).
195 S. AFRCONST. 1996 § 25(8).
196 Minister of Health & Welfare v Woodcarb (Pty) Ltd. & Another 1996 (3)
SA 155 (S. Afr.), cited in Glazewski, supra note 153, at 176-77.
197 Glazewski, supra note 1'53, at 177.
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C. California
In the United States, the Public Trust Doctrine applies to state
resource policy. While rare exceptions exist,1 98 few decisions have
found that the Public Trust Doctrine applies to federal
management of public trust resources. 199 Thus, we turn to state
court decisions to see how the Public Trust Doctrine has evolved
in modem United States jurisprudence.
Joseph Sax's dream of resurrecting the Public Trust Doctrine
found marked fulfillment in California cases. The reach of these
decisions extends internationally: passages were quoted both in the
case that implemented the Public Trust Doctrine in India, and in
the White Paper that reinstituted the Public Trust Doctrine in South
Africa. 200 Legal scholars have offered extensive commentary on
these cases; I will only summarize their holdings here, to show
how the Public Trust Doctrine reemerged in the modem era, and to
illustrate how its effects may be felt, particularly as California
courts have provided a robust interpretation of the Public Trust
Doctrine that constrains the "rights " ofprivate property owners.
The California Constitution provides that the
right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any
natural stream or water course in this State is and shall be
limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for the
beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall
not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable
method of use or unreasonable method of diversion of water.
20 1
This "right" is constrained. Subject to balancing demands, it
is not a fundamental right in the way that Indian or South African
constitutionally guaranteed environmental rights are framed, or in
the way that ajus cogens right would be framed.
In Marks v. Whitney, the California Supreme Court held that
the private owner of tidebanks in Tomales Bay had no right to
198 See Sierra Club v. Dept. of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 293 (N.D. Cal.
1975) (holding that the Secretary of the Interior violated his trustee duties by
failing to safeguard Redwood National Park from destructive timber operations.
The decision makes no mention of the "public trust" or "Public Trust
Doctrine.").
199 ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS, MODERN PUBLIC
LAND LAW IN A NUTSHELL 106-08 (3rd ed. 2006).
200 M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, 1997 (1) S.C.C. 388, 408-13 (India); see
WHITE PAPER, supra note 177, at § 5.1.2.
201 CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
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develop these lands, and private citizens were entitled to protest
such usurpation.202 The court noted that the public was entitled to
preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they
may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open
space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for
birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery
and climate of the area.
203
The court expands the public values whose realization the
Public Trust Doctrine serves to protect.
This 1971 decision marks the re-emergence of the Public
Trust Doctrine in California jurisprudence, and lays the
groundwork for the landmark 1983 case National Audubon Society-
v. Superior Court, where the court affirmed the basic tenets of the
Public Trust Doctrine. 20 4 Government may neither alienate nor
allow avoidable injury of public trust resources by private parties,
and government has a continuing duty to safeguard these resources
for benefit of the public.2 0 5 In this and subsequent public trust
decisions, the California Supreme Court has followed a precedent
dating back to Illinois Central, where the U.S. Supreme Court
looked skeptically at any government action that might endanger
public trust resources.
20 6
In National Audubon, when Los Angeles exercised
government-granted "rights" to divert water that would otherwise
have flowed into Mono Lake, it caused extreme ecological
degradation. 20 7 The court held that appropriative water rights are,
and always have been, subject to the Public Trust Doctrine, which
demands that the water right may be curtailed if protection of the
public trust resource demands it.20 8 Thus these water rights that
may harm resources protected by the trust (which the court held
applies to flowing inland waterways) cannot be vested as property
rights.2 °9
The court held that in rare cases, California officials may take
into account a growing population's need for water resources and
202 Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 381 (Cal. 1971).
203 Id. at 380.
204 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983).
205 Id. at 727-28.
206 See generally II1. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
207 Nat'l Audubon, 658 P.2d at 714-15.
208 Id. at 727.
209 Id.
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allow, uses of trust resources that harm those resources.21 °
However, these officials also have an "affirmative duty to take the
public trust into account" when balancing competing uses of trust
resources.211 Officials must continuously monitor private users
who may potentially harm trust resources.212
As in Marks v. Whitney, the court emphasized that the Public
Trust Doctrine has expanded to cover an enlarged set of natural
assets. Here, an inland navigable waterway is protected from
diversion of waters from nonnavigable tributaries. 213 Due to "the
changing public perception of the values and uses of
,,2 14waterways, new values protected under the Public Trust
Doctrine include "recreational and ecological" assets, such as "the
scenic views of the lake and its shore, the purity of the air, and the
use of the lake for nesting and feeding by birds., 215 In sum,
property rights in public trust assets are revocable, the government
has an affirmative duty to protect those rights, and the range of
public trust assets expand as modem ecological values expand.
The court reviews and applies precedent cases that deny
takings compensation because no one can acquire vested rights to
appropriate water in a way that violates "reasonable use," i.e., in a
way that harms public trust resources.216 Thus title may not
necessarily be revoked, but title is conditioned on water rights
being managed to protect (expanding) values and assets deemed to
be covered under the Public Trust Doctrine.21 7 The property here
seems less like a vested right and more like a revocable easement.
Professor Brian Gray describes the difficulty of winning
takings claims in California water cases.218  When California
changes the elements of a water "right," it is not retrospectively
and impermissibly redefining what constitutes the property right in
water.219 Rather, California has always granted such "rights "in a
210 Id. at 724, 727.
211 Id. at 728.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 721.
214 Id. at 719.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 725.
217 Id. at 722-23, 727.
218 See Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (2002).
219 Id. at 14-16.
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manner that allows the state to continually reevaluate both the
exercise of the right and the property right in water based on
evolving and contemporary judgments of what is reasonable under
the circumstances., 220 Thus these water rights "are-and always
have been-fragile. 22'
As California's population grows and water resources become
scarcer (due to increased demand exacerbated, perhaps, by climate
change-induced scarcity), it is easy to envision that the concept of
the public trust may evolve to restrict further what property
owners-either of water rights or of some forms of real property-
may do with their property. Californians have, as of yet, no
constitutionally mandated right to a clean environment or to clean
water. If citizens demand such rights (presumably through a
successful ballot initiative), as we see elsewhere, it could further
restrict what private property owners are permitted to do. Such
restrictions would be further legitimized because the government
would be acting to effect the direct will of the people, as expressed
in the constitutionally granted right.
D. Pennsylvania
Two-thirds of state constitutions in the United States afford
some protections for natural resources 222 and, as noted above, six
states have constitutional provisions that- confer environmental
rights to individuals. 223 Unlike the far-reaching implications of
constitutional provisions in India and South Africa, these
provisions have not been as effective-in protecting environmental
resources, in protecting citizens' rights to access those resources,
in fomenting additional duties of government in fulfilling its public
trust responsibilities-as framers of these constitutional
amendments would have liked.224 The litany of shortcomings
include environmental plaintiffs' unwillingness to use the
provisions; courts' decisions that the provisions are not self
executing, i.e., they do no independent legal work without explicit
legislation enabling the provisions; legislators' reluctance to pass
enabling legislation; and courts' reluctance to extend standing
220 Id. at 16.
221 Id.
222 Araiza, supra note 41, at 438.
223 Id. at 445.
224 See Matthew Thor Kirsch, Note, Upholding the Public Trust in State
Constitutions, 46 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1171-72 (1997).
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provisions to citizen plaintiffs to vindicate their constitutional
rights.225
A scholar points out that states that have successfully wielded
their constitutional provisions to achieve increased environmental
protections have all in some way codified pre-existing Public Trust
Doctrines. 226  A thorough examination of these six states'
experiences is beyond the scope of this article; however, scholars
consider the Pennsylvania constitutional provision "the most
prominent environmental amendment to a state constitution.,, 227 It
is instructive to see how that provision has fared in securing public
environmental rights or in affecting private property rights there.
In 1971, Pennsylvania voters approved an environmental
amendment that incorporates Pennsylvania's Public Trust Doctrine
as part of the state constitution.228 Article 1, Section 27 reads:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values
of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources
are the common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the
Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the
benefit of all the people.
229
In approving this amendment, voters provided a democratic
basis for the Public Trust Doctrine, sometimes criticized as being
anti-democratic.23 Yet Pennsylvania courts have been split on
what to make of the constitutionalization of the Public Trust
Doctrine. Pennsylvania's judges have been quite cautious in
extending the reach of the environmental rights amendment. But
as an explicit constitutional codification of the Public Trust
Doctrine, the amendment has provided state and local governments
225 Id. at 1171.
226 Id. at 1173.
227 John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When it
Protects the Environment: Part I-An Interpretive Framework for Article 1,
Section 27, 103 DICK. L. REv. 693, 697-98 (1999).
228 Id. at 695; Joseph W. Dellapenna, Developing a Suitable Water Allocation
Law for Pennsylvania, 17 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 81 (2006).
229 PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27.
230 Kirsch, supra note 224, at 1176 (citing James L. Huffman, Trusting the
Public Interest to Judges: A Comment on the Public Trust Writings of Professors
Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning and Johnson, 63 DENV. U. L. REv. 565, 583 (1986)
(saying the doctrine is a tool "for political losers or for those seeking to avoid the
costs of becoming political winners")).
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an additional bulwark for shoring up legislation that helps fulfill
their stewardship duties over public trust resources and helps them
avoid takings claims when such legislation constrains private
property rights.
A court held that the amendment provides a self-executing
right when the government enjoins private actions that threaten the
public's trust assets.231 When the state challenged construction of
a tall tower near Gettysburg National Military Park,
Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate court agreed that the
amendment clearly invokes the government's ability to act as a
trustee to protect named environmental rights, and noted that since
private parties are responsible for much environmental
degradation, the government as public trustee must be able to
challenge private parties' threats to protected resources.232
However, in a sharply divided opinion, signed by only two
justices, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court argued that the provision
was not self-executing: the government, exercising its public trust
duties, was not permitted to instigate actions against private
individuals in the name of the constitutional amendment.233 The
court feared that state government officers would use the
amendment to persecute individual property owners, and argued
that to allow the government to act to vindicate public trust rights
against private parties could raise numerous due process and equal
protection violations.234 (They did not mention takings.)
Furthermore, the court ruled that terms like "natural, scenic,
historic and esthetic values" are vague and all encompassing, and
that "clean air" and "pure water" required more technically precise
definitions.235 The court held that without supporting legislation,
private property rights would be unduly threatened, as the
"property owner would not know and would have no way, short of
expensive litigation, of finding out what he could do with his
property. '236 The court believed that codifying the Public Trust
Doctrine as a constitutional amendment does no meaningful work
231 Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 302 A.2d 886,
892 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
232 Id.
233 Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588,
594-95 (Pa. ,1973).
234 Id. at 593.
235 Id.
236 Id.
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without supplemental legislation that executes the amendment.
237
The dissenters agreed with the intermediate court, arguing that
the amendment makes explicit the government's public trust
responsibility.238 The dissenters argued that
[t]his Court has been given the opportunity to affirm the
mandate of the public empowering the Commonwealth to
prevent environmental abuses; instead, the Court has
chosen to emasculate a constitutional amendment by
declaring it not to be self-executing. 9
The dissent concludes that these rights are enumerated and
should be self-executing against private individuals: "[t]he
amendment thus installs the common law public trust doctrine as a
constitutional right to environmental protection ....
Courts have considered the amendment self-executing when
citizens challenge government officials, whose public trust duties
the amendment clearly codifies.241 In Payne v. Kasab, residents of
Wilkes-Barre brought suit challenging street widening plans by
Pennsylvania's Department of Transportation that allegedly would
impair a public park, in violation of the environmental
amendment's protection for "historical, scenic, recreational, and
environmental values.... ,,242 The court agreed that these
provisions are self-executing against the government and that
citizens, "as beneficiaries of the public trust thereby created" by
the environmental amendment, have standing to bring such a suit:
There can be no question that the Amendment itself
declares and creates a public trust of public natural
resources for the benefit of all the people (including future
generations as yet unborn) and that the Commonwealth is
made the trustee of said resources, commanded to
conserve and maintain them. No implementing legislation
is needed to enunciate these broad purposes and establish
these relationships.
243
The court viewed the Payne case as less controversial than the
Gettysburg case because challenges to government actions hold
237 Id. at 595.
238 Id. at 597.
239 Id. at 596.
240 Id.
241 Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 272 (Pa. 1976).
242 Id. at 264.
243 Id. at 272.
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fewer due process or takings implications. However, even though
citizens could use the environmental amendment to challenge
government actions, the court in Payne ruled against the citizens,
adopting this test:
(1) Was there compliance with all applicable statutes and
regulations relevant to the protection of the Commonwealth's
public natural resources? (2) Does the record demonstrate a
reasonable effort to reduce the environmental incursion to a
minimum? (3) Does the environmental harm which will result
from the challenged decision or action so clearly outweigh the
benefits to be derived therefrom that to proceed further would
be an abuse of discretion?
244
Professor John Dernbach argues that when the court adopted
the Payne test, it curtailed potential impacts of the amendment.245
The court held that the environmental amendment creates "no
automatic right to relief," but that the government must balance the
public trust rights codified in the amendment against other
government duties (here, maintaining a highway system). In
Payne, the latter trumped the former.24 6 While the balancing must
take notice of the high priority given environmental conservation,
as reflected in the amendment, it nonetheless requires only that
government agencies take reasonable efforts to mitigate any
environmental harms from projects they approve.
As a result of the three-part test, plaintiffs invoking the
amendment to challenge environmentally damaging projects do
not win. In fact, according to one scholar, plaintiffs have never
prevailed under the Payne test to overturn a state action, despite
over thirty challenges as of 1997.247 By naming the test, the court
severely limited the potential reach of the amendment beyond
protections already offered in other environmental statutes.248 To
put it another way, "[t]he state's responsibility for publicly owned
resources-the resources over which it has greatest control-is not
244 Id. at 273 n.23.
245 John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When it
Protects the Environment: Part II-Environmental Rights and the Public Trust,
104 DICK. L. REV. 97, 164 (1999).
246 Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d at 273.
247 Kirsch, supra note 224, at 1201-02. Kirsch continues, '.[b]y effectively
rejecting any real review under the Payne test, the Pennsylvania courts have
undermined the intent of the Pennsylvanians who adopted the state constitution's
environmental protection provision." Id. at 1202.
248 Dembach, supra note 227, at 710-12.
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to conserve them or preserve their values, but rather to manage
their degradation under the Payne test.
249
However, the environmental amendment has provided some
groundwork for strengthening the common law application of the
Public Trust Doctrine. Once supporting legislation passes that
explicitly alludes to the constitutional provisions, the
environmental amendment buttresses challenges to the legitimacy
of such legislation. This helps to shore up government actions
taken to fulfill its stewardship duties under the Public Trust
Doctrine as now codified in the constitution, and potentially
dampens takings claims. Any ambiguity inherent in the Public
Trust Doctrine is made clearer by explicit provisions of the
constitutional amendment. Furthermore, as in the case below,
legislators and executive bureaucrats invoke the amendment when
they act in ways that purport to fulfill the government's
constitutional duty to protect public trust resources.
For example, a Pennsylvania court held that the
"Environmental Rights Amendment reflects a state policy
encouraging the preservation of historic and aesthetic resources,"
and thus government regulators in Philadelphia (who explicitly
reference the amendment in their actions) could legitimately deem
a privately owned theatre as an historic landmark without violating
private property rights.250  This decision illustrates that the
constitutional provision codifying the Public Trust Doctrine
permissibly expands the actual resources covered: here, the Public
Trust Doctrine is held to include human-made historical structures
that the government is permitted and even obliged to steward to
protect the esthetic rights of all citizens.
Dernbach notes that the amendment is more symbolic than
substantive and rarely used in decision-making. 25' However, as in
the Philadelphia theatre case, the amendment supports decisions
that are challenged on other grounds. Moreover, "[h]owever
tentatively, such cases recognize that Article I, Section 27 matters
because it does something that statutes and regulations cannot do;
it makes environmental and historic protection part of the
249 Id. at 713.
250 United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612,
620 (Pa. 1993).
251 Dernbach, supra note 227, at 696.
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constitutional purpose of state government. 252
Dernbach argues that the amendment both codifies an
expansive set of resources protected under the Public Trust
Doctrine, and that the amendment is best understood to name the
public's procedural right to responsible government stewardship
under their constitutionally-enforced traditional roles as public
trustees.253 This is what Sax envisioned as a necessary corollary of
the Public Trust Doctrine. Even if citizens usually lose because of
the high standards of the Payne test, Pennsylvania courts have
interpreted the amendment to provide enhanced court access for
citizen plaintiffs to challenge government actions that threaten
their environmental rights.
254
In Franklin Township v. Department of Environmental
Resources, the court named its test for standing: "a party must (a)
have a substantial interest in the subject-matter of the litigation; (b)
the interest must be direct; and (c) the interest must be immediate
and not a remote consequence. '255  When a town and county
challenged a toxic waste processing facility, they were considered
"legal persons" whose "direct" "immediate" "substantial interest"
stems from their role in protecting the "esthetic and environmental
well-being." 256 These are threatened, as illustrated by "[r]ecent
events.., replete with ecological horrors (e.g., Love Canal) that
have damaged the environment and threatened plant, animal and
human life., 257 Environmental assets "are important aspects of the
quality of life in our society. '258 The municipalities have standing
partially because "among the responsibilities of local government
is the protection and enhancement of the quality of life of its
citizens. Indeed, it is a constitutional charge which must be
respected by all levels of government in the Commonwealth. 259
The environmental amendment thus bolsters the town's
eligibility for standing; in fact, the environmental provision seems
to require (it is a "constitutional charge") that it seek such standing
to vindicate its citizens' environmental rights. The court
252 Id. at 697.
253 Id. at 699.
254 See id. at 723.
255 Franklin Twp. v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 452 A.2d 718, 719 (Pa. 1982).
256 Id. at 720-22.
257 Id. at 720.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 721-22.
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concluded that "Franklin Township and Fayette County have a
substantial, direct and immediate interest in the establishment and
operation of a toxic waste landfill within its boundaries so as to
give each standing to challenge the issuance of a permit.
' 260
The Public Trust Doctrine's "substantive haziness and unclear
legal foundation ' 26' find firmer moorings in constitutional
provisions guaranteeing environmental rights. While the
Pennsylvania environmental amendment has not provided all the
substantive results its backers might have hoped for, it has
expanded (beyond the traditional reach of the Public Trust
Doctrine) the procedural rights of citizens to vindicate their
environmental rights. And, as in the Philadelphia theatre case, it
can be. invoked to support government actions that do protect
public trust resources.262 Officials can use the amendment as
rationale to support their actions in the name of the public trust.
constitutional amendments are also more permanent environmental
laws that may prove inconvenient should prevailing winds of
public sentiment change; while it's easy to repeal legislation, it's
much more difficult to amend a constitution.263
But, in Pennsylvania, conservative courts have clipped the
wings of a bold experiment to see how far environmental
protections and procedural rights might extend when the Public
Trust Doctrine is codified in the form of a constitutionally
guaranteed environmental right. Pennsylvania courts have
declined to take the hard, skeptical look envisioned by Sax (and
envisioned by the amendment's authors) when government actions
appear to violate public trust resources as named in the
environmental amendment. Had courts adopted different tests,
where they viewed the amendment as limiting the government's
power or requiring it to act in a certain way to perform certain
duties in the name of public trust environmental resources, or
where they allowed the amendment to be self executing against
private actors, the amendment might have affirmatively named
additional responsibilities required under the public trust (as such
amendments do in India and South Africa).
260 Id. at 723.
26 Araiza, supra note 41, at 452.
262 Dernbach, supra note 227, at 727.
261 See id. Kirsch argues that voters opted for constitutional amendments
instead of new laws because such an amendment "protects policy judgments
from the ebb and flow of the political tide." Kirsch, supra note 224, at 1170.
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For example, a scholar points out that Louisiana courts have
adopted a tougher test when examining government actions that
threaten public trust resources, even though Louisiana's
constitutional natural resource protections are not framed in rights
language.264 Louisiana courts require that government do an
explicit cost benefit analysis to show that actions potentially
harming environmental resources are justified by greater public
good, while Pennsylvania's test requires that environmental harms
"clearly outweigh" the social and economic benefits before a
government action will be deemed unacceptable. 265 Furthermore,
while the Pennsylvania Payne test requires only "reasonable
effort" to mitigate environmental harms, Louisiana's test requires
that "potential and real adverse environmental effects... be[]
avoided to the maximum extent possible. 266
Furthermore, as we saw in India and South Africa, a United
States court could use the combination of the Public Trust Doctrine
and an environmental rights amendment to show that citizens are
directly demanding that the government take affirmative steps to
vindicate their traditional, now-directly-expressed rights. The
amendment could be seen as a democratic assertion that
obligations the sovereign has been understood to have for centuries
take on new urgency through the direct will of the people voiced in
the amendment. Legislators and bureaucrats could use this as
cover for actions that aggressively protect public trust assets;
judges could be aggressively skeptical about government actions
that fail to execute the environmental will of the people.
CONCLUSION: THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, ENVIRONMENTAL
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE FUTURE OF TAKINGS AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY
I have shown that the Public Trust Doctrine, when translated
into or put in service of Environmental Human Rights, offers new
policy and legal strategies for protecting environmental resources,
and for protecting citizens' ability to use those resources
sustainably, now and in the future. That's what I believe is
happening.
But underlying this article is a normative -belief that this is
264 Kirsch, supra note 224, at 1195-96.
265 Payne, 361 A.2d at 273 n.23.
266 Kirsch, supra note 224, at 1201.
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
20081
HeinOnline  -- 16 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 759 2008
N.Y. U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
what should happen. I wish to promote a world of deep equity.
By this, I mean values, actions, and laws promoting sustainable
pathways that maximize the health and potential of all individuals,
communities, and ecosystems. The equity is deep because it asks
that values become rooted within each individual; because it
requires a fundamental re-imagining of our community structures
and responsibilities; and because these values and responsibilities
must become entrenched and encoded in our legal systems. Our
laws would then, in turn, support values and actions promoting
even deeper equity.
The Public Trust Doctrine stands for the proposition that some
of nature's gifts inherently belong to all people, and the
government must steward these to prevent both private arrogation
of public resources and the "tragedy of the commons" from
unfettered public access to these shared resources.267
Environmental Human Rights represent a growing movement to
codify this belief, to make positive law that firms up the
philosophy promulgated for 1,500 or so years in the name of the
Public Trust Doctrine.
In addition, the Public Trust Doctrine has expanded its reach
to cover more of the Earth as the interrelatedness of ecosystem
processes becomes more defined, and the success of the strategy in
protecting those processes becomes more apparent. Environmental
Human Rights build on those legal successes, while expanding
what falls under the aegis of public resources in a world of
sophisticated, ecosystemic understanding.
The Public Trust Doctrine encourages government officials to
fulfill their stewardship duties. Codified Environmental Human
Rights not only encourage government officials to perform duties,
but demand they do so, either because of (sometimes judicially
enforced) interpretations of constitutional provisions, or through
spreading belief that Environmental Human Rights create
obligations erga omnes, i.e., duties that must be performed.
As advocated by Joseph Sax and as realized in various courts,
the Public Trust Doctrine may provide the public with direct
access to vindicate violations of the public trust by government
officials. Environmental Human Rights give greater force to these
procedural rights, giving enhanced access to challenge official
actions that impinge upon the fundamental rights. These
267 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
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procedural rights may either be tools for vindicating other named
rights, or they may be the environmental human right themselves.
Furthermore, once rights obtain, plaintiffs do not merely represent
a general public good; rather, they represent their own rights. And,
perhaps most significantly for private property "rights,"
Environmental Human Rights leave more doors open for private
parties to become defendants when they act-even on their own
property-to violate the public good.
The Public Trust Doctrine urges judges to take a hard,
skeptical look when government action appears to allow private
interest to impede public trust environmental resources.
Environmental Human Rights requires judges to take a hard,
skeptical look, not just when government action appears to impede
public trust resources, but when officials are not doing enough
proactively to fulfill their duties to promote public trust
environmental interests.
The Public Trust Doctrine naturally shrinks what constitutes
private property rights (and moves us to reconsider them as
"private" "property" "rights"), either because certain resources
never actually were subject to private usurpation, or never should
have been. As Sax puts it, "it is difficult to understand why the
government should be prevented from taking property which is
owned by the public as a whole." 268 Environmental Human Rights
further constrain "private" "property" "rights," not only because
the movement builds on the history and philosophy encoded in the
Public Trust Doctrine, but because rights language, (particularly as
we move further on the spectrum towards inviolable rights),
creates obligations from which no one-including private
citizens-may derogate, and which trump local or national laws.
The closer we come to seeing Environmental Human Rights as
inviolable rights, the greater the responsibility of each of us, as
interconnected global citizens, not only to uphold these rights, but
to promote them actively, and to shame those who do not respect
or promote these rights.
Throughout United States takings jurisprudence, private
property advocates have argued that government actions in the
name of "public use" have chipped away at their fundamental
property "rights." They argue the Fifth Amendment exists to
protect these minority rights from the tyranny of the majority, and
268 Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 9, at 479.
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they protest that these rights have taken a backseat to other rights
that all arms of government tend to view, unfairly, as somehow
more fundamental. Certainly, United States governments at all
levels have acted aggressively to circumscribe what individuals
may do with/on their own property, and courts have backed up
government actions taken in the name of "public use" or the
"public good." The Mugler v. Kansas and Hadacheck v. Sebastian
line of takings cases held that private property never connotes the
right to commit public nuisance, and government may redefine
what constitutes an impermissible nuisance with no resulting
takings claims for those who had previously been acting within the
bounds of acceptable property use. 2 69  As the Court notes in
Hadacheck, "[t]here must be progress, and if in its march private
interests are in the way they must yield to the good of the
community. ' 270 The National Audubon Mono Lake case and its
progeny show that water "rights" are not property, but a kind of
revocable, usufruct privilege that is and always has been subject to
government redefinition to reflect the changing needs of the
citizenry-to reflect changing notions of progress. The "owner" of
such "rights" is always on notice of this, and thus when
government redefines the privilege, the "owner" has no grounds
for a takings claim.27'
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York, the
Supreme Court named a balancing test that gives governments
broad latitude to define what serves the public interest, and thus
what constraints may be placed on private property in the public's
name.272  The Public Trust Doctrine supports the notion that
"private" ".property" ".owners"' "investment-backed
expectations" 273 should always include the idea that certain
resources are and always have been within the public's
provenance. Environmental constitutional provisions more clearly
269 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394 (1915).
270 Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 410.
27' Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 722 (Cal. 1983).
See also United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967) (holding that riparian
private property owners have always been subject to the federal government's
navigational servitude, and thus appellant receives no full market value takings
compensation for a property right they never fully possessed).
27 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (balancing nature and strength of government's
regulatory interest for the public good against economic loss of property owner).
273 Id.
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enunciate what the public wishes done in its own name. They tip
the balancing test a bit further by putting direct democracy in
service of state actions that steward natural resources (even those
found on private property) for the public good.
Even bright line rules that attempt to name when government
goes "too far" to protect the public-i.e., when physical
occupation 274 or regulations that result in 100% loss of economic
value 275 constitute an impermissible violation of private property
"rights"-rarely obtain in the real world of takings jurisprudence.
That is to say, even without invoking the Public Trust Doctrine or
Environmental Human Rights, United States governments, abetted
by the courts, have acted as if very little is fundamental in terms of
a "right" to use one's property as one wishes.
The Public Trust Doctrine suggests, and Environmental
Human Rights push hard, the notion that the minority never had
these rights in the first place. Private property rights advocates
might say that Justinian defined the Public Trust Doctrine (and
associated private property rights) by ipse dixit, an unfounded
assertion, and subsequent generations have impermissibly and
mysteriously reified the Doctrine by chanting its name loudly and
repeatedly. But those speaking on behalf of the Public Trust
Doctrine or Environmental Human Rights might argue that private
property "rights" advocates have engaged in ipsedixitism by
asserting that Lockean natural law 276 justifies private property
ownership, due in some mysterious way to the natural endowments
(or, as Madison put it, from the "diversity in the faculties of
men"277) that naturally justifies the right of some to usurp portions
of the Earth that ought to belong to us all. Environmental Human
Rights counters this by suggesting that the inherent dignity of all
humans depends on sustainable access to certain natural goods and
services.
While some of our founding fathers saw private property as
the key to freedom, 278 the Public Trust Doctrine and
Environmental Human Rights suggest freedom requires access to a
274 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982);
275 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
276 JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 16-17 (1998).
277 Id. at 49 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison)).
278 Id. at 3-4.
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wide range of ecological assets that ought always to have been in
the public realm. They further suggest that property rights spring
not from natural law but from positive law, rooted in the will of the
people, which allow temporary loans of property "rights" from the
sovereign acting in the name of the public good. Benjamin
Franklin believed that "Property... is a Creature of Society, and is
subject to the Calls of that Society, whenever its Necessities shall
require it ...., What the sovereign gives in the name of the
people, the sovereign can redefine or revoke when the people's
needs change.
Furthermore, I believe the "natural law" Madison and others
used to justify private property "rights" is gradually being replaced
by a different kind of "natural law": rather than reflect some
divinely ordained order, human laws must reflect some
ecologically ordained restraints. To survive as a civilization, or as
a species, means to heed the limits a mechanical natural world
imposes on us. We are biological creatures who pretend we
transcend biology. "Private property" advocates sometimes argue
that they are best stewards of the land, but it would take several
more papers to document how reality often fails to reflect this. In
the name of capitalism-a social and economic system that largely
ignores the ecological basis of our existence-private property
owners exploit resources we increasingly recognize we need for
the public good, or even for human survival. With human
numbers and needs increasing, and with growing evidence that
business as usual results in degraded ecosystems, and with the
ominous specter of large scale global disruptions, the balance is
tilting-as it should-away from preference for the "private" and
towards preference for protection of the "public." When
something is defined as an environmental human right, we must
reconsider the balance between private commercial and public
environmental interests so that the latter's stock is on the rise. In
capitalist societies, naming Environmental Human Rights provides
strong ethical justification that helps to recalibrate priorities that
normally favor economic freedom over other kinds of human
freedoms.
279 William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 700
(1985) (quoting Benjamin Franklin, Queries and Remarks Respecting Alterations
in the Constitution of Pennsylvania, in 10 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN 54, 59 (A. Smythe ed. 1907)).
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Environmental Human Rights, the further they are towards the
inviolable rights end of the spectrum, suggest that it does not
matter what property owners' expectations were: they have
nonderogable duties now that are supreme to any expectations they
might have had- or laws that might have facilitated those
expectations. World consensus-as reflected in national
constitutions, international agreements, and the work of legal
scholars-is nudging this notion of Environmental Human Rights
towards status of fundamental rights, or even inviolable rights.
While the United States lags behind nations like India or South
Africa in recognizing Environmental Human Rights, as we saw in
the Ninth Circuit's Sarei decision,280 and we see in hesitant
attempts to amend state constitutions (and to effectuate those
amendments), that Environmental Human Rights may yet obtain in
the United States. The United States is now awakening from its
long slumber and confronting the reality of global climate change;
multiple laws committing individual states to curb greenhouse gas
emissions, and nascent federal initiatives following state and
international leads will further constrain "private" ".property"
"owners"' ability to degrade common resources-the air, the ice
caps, the oceans-that ought to be stewarded in public trust for the
survival of all citizens of Earth.
The Public Trust Doctrine has always reflected a value
preference for public over private access to environmental assets.
Invoking environmental rights as human rights amplifies the
public's right, now and in the future, to share in ecological gifts
fundamental to human health and wellbeing. By linking the hoary
Public Trust Doctrine to the modem Environmental Human Rights
movement, citizens, scholars, and lawyers can promote a world of
deeper equity for individuals, communities, and the natural world.
280 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007).
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